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The subject of this dissertation is the impact of Digital Rights Management (DRM) 
systems on existing issues of fair use, in terms of standard copyright legislation, privacy 
issues and control of the actual DRM mechanism. I will look at both the international 
situation, predominantly that of the United States being the forerunner in the DRM 
market, and at the South African situation and the particular socio-economic nuances 
here that make the situation unique. I propose to explore the subject of DRM, through a 
review of current literature, by defining DRM itself, exploring its purpose, looking at the 
current models and the problems that arise through their use. Furthermore, I propose to 
look at the various forces shaping the DRM debate in the United States. I will then 
examine the DRM situation in South Africa, defining the peculiar issues that effect DRM 
in South Africa, examining the regulatory and socio-economic environments and 
determining whether the issues arising in the United States are applicable to the South 
African situation. Finally, I intend to close with a discussion of possible solutions being 
posited in the United States and a suggestion as to the general direction in which the 
DRM debate should be moving. 
 
My analysis of the South African situation is informed by assumptions drawn 
from an examination of the current operating environment (be it legal or technological) 
that DRM would fall into and assessing how the issues arising with DRM in the United 
States would be affected by the particular environment in South Africa, or whether DRM 
will be an issue at all. 
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2. WHAT IS DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT? 
 
In this chapter I will attempt to give a brief explanation of what DRM is as an 
understanding of the rational for the development of DRM as well as an understanding of 
how it works is essential as a background for the legal arguments to be raised at a later 
stage. 
 
Since the onset of the Internet and the increase in both digital technologies and the 
use thereof for both storing and transferring valuable content, it has become imperative 
that such content accordingly be afforded protection so as to maintain the value thereof 
for the holder of the copyright. Enter Digital Rights Management (DRM). DRM was 
developed as a means for maintaining this value. The issue at the forefront of DRM is 
trust. DRM uses technology and business methodology to assure that this trust is 
possible. This in turn can provide, and has hoped to create, a possible means for 
establishing some level of constancy or stasis in the current ever changing and uncertain 
arena of digital intellectual property (InterTrust Inc, 2002).  
 
 Since the concept of protecting creative works by means of a copyright afforded 
to the creator of the work, issues have emerged which have threatened the existing status 
quo of producers of creative/intellectual/valuable content. But “disruptive technologies” 
(InterTrust Inc, 2002), such as the Video Cassette Recorder, have always emerged and 
have generally been dealt with by a paradigm shift on the part of the content owners and 
an amendment to the current legislation in order to encompass the new technology. Often 
this has required a new way of thinking about how valuable content is protected and how 
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a revenue stream can be created and/or sustained by means of the ownership of this 
valuable content.  
 
Supporters of the imposition of a stringent technological or legal system as a 
means of protecting digital content argue that the Internet is exceptional due to the 
capabilities it has for reaching multiple markets, and to the digital nature of the content 
transferred, which enables users to make perfect reproductions of the content, and then 
transmit such copy, almost instantaneously. Previously, with analog content, copies could 
be made but this was often time consuming and always resulted in a loss of quality of the 
content being duplicated in the resultant copy. This argument is partly valid and partly 
invalid. The Internet does have the ability to reach a vast number of consumers in a 
disparate number of places which traditional person-to-person real world access could not 
achieve. However, this does not need to be a disadvantage. This factor is only viewed by 
the owners of digital content as a negative factor when considered together with the 
nature of the content being digital. Digital content owners would normally be only too 
happy to have access to such a vast marketplace, but when they fear that their content 
will be copied with no loss of quality, almost instantaneously, they feel that the 
motivation to purchase such content is removed.  
 
This chapter briefly explained DRM. However, a mere explanation of what DRM 
is does not demonstrate explicitly why DRM is important. The next chapter goes into 




3. THE BENEFITS OF DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT OR WHY DOES 
ONE NEED DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT TOOLS? 
 
DRM is a tool which can be beneficial to people wishing to protect valuable digital 
content. Why it is beneficial and for whom such benefit can accrue is demonstrated in 
this chapter. 
 
DRM is not only necessary or desirable for people in the entertainment industry, 
i.e. music or film, but can also be an important tool for doctors, lawyers and other 
professionals wishing to transfer valuable digital content across an essentially 
unprotected network. Traditional and simple cryptography techniques that have been 
used for centuries to protect confidential information can be, and are, used to protect 
information sent over digital networks. The problem arises when the information needs to 
be utilized and treated differently depending on who is accessing the information.  It 
needs to be easily available to certain individuals whilst being kept private from others 
or, various users utilize the information differently and for different purposes, requiring 
different rights of access. The use may necessitate payment or registration by certain 
users which would require a careful process of tracking the use of content as well as 




DRM is a complicated procedure involving a number of different but intricately 
linked processes. The next chapter seeks to explain these processes clearly so that the 
various stages of the procedure can be examined, understood and ultimately analysed. 
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4. HOW DOES DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT WORK? 
 
According to the model utilised by InterTrust (InterTrust Inc, 2002) DRM protects any 
content working within any business model selected and utilised by the customer. 
Furthermore, it supports any and all methods of distribution that one may choose to use to 
distribute content, for example, downloading content from the Internet or from a website, 
streaming, burning onto a CD or DVD. Furthermore, and most importantly for the current 
debate, InterTrust’s version of DRM does not tie one to any particular device to access or 
protect digital content: one can utilise a desktop PC or a mobile phone. This will become 
particularly pertinent in the discussion on the monopolistic attitude of the various players 
involved in the debate over DRM. 
 
 The technology used by InterTrust operates in the following manner: the content 
owner selects the digital content that he/she wishes to protect. The content is then 
encrypted using encryption software. A “packager” (the best analogy to describe a 
packager is a zip program – it is a software tool that creates a new encrypted/proprietary 
file with the appropriate rights embedded in the file) is then used to determine specific 
usage rules to apply to the specific digital content/ digital products to be sold. These 
usage rules are delivered (delivery seems to consist of the creation of the file and the 
placing of it in a format usable by retailers – for example on a CD, on a web server) in a 
secure file called a Rights Pack (InterTrust Inc, 2002). The encrypted digital content is 
then sent to the retailer and it is placed on the retailer’s content distribution system. At 
the same time the Usage Rules (in the form of a Rights Pack) that have been specified for 
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the digital products are sent to the Content Rights Server. This Content Rights Server 
would not have to be located at InterTrust, but given the need for these servers to be 
hack-proof, it probably would be located at InterTrust. In fact it is doubtful that the 
InterTrust business model allows for any other servers to fulfill this function (InterTrust, 
Inc 2002). The product is now ready to be purchased. The purchaser selects the digital 
product that they wish to purchase and pays for the product in the same way that any 
payment over the Internet would occur. The payment is cleared through the retailer’s 
payment clearing system. The purchase is then authorised and such authority is 
transmitted to the rights software on the purchaser’s device. The content is now ready to 
be redeemed and retrieved (InterTrust Inc, 2002). Once the authorisation has been 
retrieved the software on the purchaser’s device automatically retrieves the content from 
the Content Distribution System (InterTrust Inc, 2002) and retrieves the usage rules 
contained in the Rights Package from the Content Rights Server. When both the 
encrypted digital content selected by the purchaser and the usage rules defined in the 
Rights Package have been downloaded on the purchaser’s device, the purchaser can 
access the content according to the rules defined for that particular digital product in the 
Rights Package. 
 
DRM systems have been a long time in development and much time and effort 
has gone into their creation. One therefore assumes that they have also been developed 
with a specific purpose in mind. The following chapter looks at the purpose of DRM. 
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5. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT? 
 
DRM is a technological means that has been developed to protect the valuable digital 
content that is transferred over an unsecured digital network to provide compensation 
where compensation is due. So, for example, if one writes a song and a record company 
produces the song and a CD is released for public consumption and sold in the shops for 
R100, a portion of that R100 would be paid to the songwriter as the Copyright Holder of 
the material and would be compensated for creative input and resultant creative work. For 
the price of R100 the purchaser would get the limited right to use the creative work. 
However with technological advancements it is now possible for the purchaser to place a 
CD in the CD drive of their PC and to copy the digital format of the music onto their 
hard-drives. This in itself is not an infringement, or should not be an infringement as I 
propose that this falls directly into the fair use exception in terms of copyright law. From 
there they are able to send a copy of the digital format to any number of other people who 
have not paid compensation for the use of the CD. This is where the problem arises. A 
method is thus needed to ensure that adequate compensation flows to copyright holders in 
exchange for the limited but fair use of creative works. 
 
In fact even non-digital existing creative works are at threat. If one considers that 
cassette tapes can be turned into MP3’s – which are not digital per se but would also need 
the protection of DRM. This raises another argument in the whole DRM debate, namely 
that of whether or not DRM depends on the hardware utilised, irrespective of whether it 
need originally be digital or not. 
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The benefit, purpose and way that DRM works have all been discussed. It is clear 
that DRM has a clear function and purpose. However, DRM also raises numerous issues 
which were not essentially part of the original purpose or function of DRM but are 
intimately involved in any DRM system. Chapter 6 seeks to outline some of the 
contentious issues involved in DRM. 
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6. UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN MANAGING ONLINE 
DIGITAL CONTENT 
 
There are a number of very valid concerns surrounding the use of technological means to 
protect valuable content. These issues range from broad policy concerns that DRM is 
going to be manipulated as a means for harvesting more profit from an existing consumer 
base by means of a pay-per-use system of licensing (Adkinson and Eisenach, 2002), to 
the concerns that are raised about user rights, in particular, the right of fair use endowed 
upon the user in terms of Copyright Law, the constitutional right to privacy and the 
associated concerns around data mining. The control that is given either to copyright 
owners or to the people owning the means of protection, DRM, is also a concern as this 
control is far-reaching, expansive and powerful. This control would facilitate the 
“unbundling” of user rights (Adkinson and Eisenach, 2002) which is not a good thing for 
the consumer. An article published last year in Wired Magazine posited that DRM is 
merely a mechanism enabling content owners to exploit the consumer, stating, ‘Big 
Media want you to pay for what you read, watch and hear – and keep paying. DRM 
technology will make sure you do.’ (Howe, 2001). This in itself is not necessarily a bad 
thing provided that the price is right and that access is easy.  
 
However, critics of this form of control maintain that the only people this is 
benefiting are the owners of the digital content or the devices that enable the control of 
the digital content. The result to the consumer is that they will now have to pay for rights 
which previously fell under their right to fair use (Adkinson and Eisenach, 2002). These 
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were previously free and non-infringing uses of legally purchased copyrighted material.  
This raises the whole price-gap argument that will be discussed at a later stage. In 
essence, the price-gap argument is similar to the argument upon which Black Market 
economics is based.  If goods have specific production values which are less than their 
sales value, they can be sold for profit.  A free market with competition creates a smaller 
and smaller gap between sale price and production value as competitors enter the market 
and either differentiate on service and offerings or cut costs and become more efficient to 
compete.  This is why there is such a market for pirated CD’s (arguably it has nothing or 
very little to do with MP3’s and digital piracy via downloading on the peer-to-peer 
networks) as the production cost for CD’s is about $1 (admittedly, the overall cost is 
probably about $3), but the sale price is $20.  The monopoly imposed by “copyright” 
means that producers could charge whatever they like in the sale of the goods. I argue 
that the motivation by big media for DRM is merely an attempt to protect their massive 
profit margins (Adkinson and Eisenach, 2002). 
 
 Proponents of extreme technological protective measures state that these 
measures are in actuality a means of protecting the consumer. They base this somewhat 
strange statement on the argument that without measures ensuring that the copyright 
holder has their content protected at all times (and thus facilitating adequate 
compensation to flow back to the creator), it might not happen that any creative work is 
created for the consumer to enjoy at all (Adkinson and Eisenach, 2002). This sounds like 
a rather circuitous argument meant to couch simple greediness in a concern for the 
creative good and benefit to society. It has been shown in many ways that over-regulation 
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never feeds creativity but in fact stifles it (Levine, 2002). Furthermore the very purpose 
of the fair use provisions in copyright laws was to allow people to utilise (to a limited 
extent) other people’s creations in order to stimulate their own creativity. Thus it is 
argued that creation begets creation. 
 
 There is no agreement amongst the various interest groups as to how protection of 
digital content should occur, to what extent this should be driven by the legislature, and 
to what extent it should be determined by technological solutions or informed by big 
media. But this is not necessarily a bad thing when one takes into account the dynamic 
state of the market and the lack of certainty as to what technology, if technology does 
provide the solution, will become the standard and how this will interact with any 
legislative measures implemented already by Congress and those to be implemented in 
the future. It is, however, of general consensus that policy changes will be needed and as 
Adkinson and Eisenach state: ‘In the long run, however, we believe policy changes will 
be needed…’(Adkinson and Eisenach, 2002). 
 
The following chapters will undertake a more detailed discussion of the rights of 
fair use and privacy, detailing the legal nature of these rights, their purpose, how they are 
traditionally protected and an explanation of the threat that they are under from DRM. 
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7. THE RIGHT OF FAIR USE 
 
Fair use is recognized in terms of copyright law as non-infringing use of a work by an 
authorised purchaser. In other words two elements need to be present in order for fair use 
to arise. Firstly, the user must be in possession of a legally obtained copy of the work. 
Secondly, the further copying or otherwise of this work must not constitute an 
infringement of the copyright holder’s rights.  
 
South African legislation incorporates the right of fair use into the Copyright Act 
98 of 1978 at Section 12 thereof.  Section 12, deals with the general exceptions from the 
copyright afforded to musical and literary works. In the United States, fair use in 
copyrighted works is dealt with in Title 17 of Section 107 of the U.S. Code.  There are 
certain guiding principles to be used when determining what does or does not constitute 
fair use and thus fall under an exemption from the copyright laws.  
 
7.1 The Principles of the Right of Fair Use 
 
The four main principles of the right of fair use can be expressed as questions and 
summarised as follows: 
 
1. What are the purpose and the character of the use? 
2. What is the nature of the copyrighted work? 
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3. How substantial is the portion used when compared to the copyright work as a 
whole? 
4. What is the effect of the use upon the potential for, or the value of the 
copyrighted work? (University of Delaware, 1998). 
 
Simplistically put, these questions basically determine the commercial impact that the 
breach of copyright will have on the ability of the copyright holder to make a return 
(however quantified) on their creative product. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to 
determine whether or not an action on the part of the consumer is considered to fall 
within the fair use exemption, but rather it is something which would need to be carefully 
considered and determined on a casuistic basis. 
 
From a social perspective fair use serves a type of balancing function. A balance 
needs to be maintained between the owner’s right of ownership in the creative work and 
the social good of an environment of free speech, the transfer of knowledge, an open 
environment for learning and criticism and the creativity which flows therefrom. But the 
social benefits are not all “airy-fairy” benefits.  
 
7.2 The Market Benefits of the Right of Fair Use 
 
There are real market benefits of fair use in instances where the transactional cost of 
licensing outstrips the actual value of the product to the consumer. In this instance, the 
market failure that would exist from this absurd situation is corrected by allowing the 
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user a right of fair use in instances such as this (Burk, 2001). Another economic benefit 
demonstrated by the allowance of a doctrine of fair use is that of knowledge transfer. This 
facilitates reverse engineering, especially in computer software programs not under 
patent law, by allowing the copyrighted material to be utilized in a limited sense. (Sony 
Computer Entertainment Inc v Connectix Corp, 203 F.3d 596, 602-08 (9th Cir. 2000). 
This in turn facilitates innovation and allows for a successfully reverse-engineered-
program to emerge. It might seem as if it should not be a desired outcome of law that one 
legal framework allows for another to be broken down. However, an important point to 
note, is that this kind of innovation, based on reverse engineering, can prevent a 
monopoly which could otherwise be established by patent. This cannot have been the 
intention of the legislators drafting the patent laws (Samuelson, 1993). 
 
It is also important to note that in the past the argument about a device having a 
substantial non-infringing use formed part of the fair use doctrine, as often fair use would 
provide the substantial non-infringing element. For example, the VCR was held to be 
legal as it had a substantial non-infringing use, namely that of allowing its users to record 
a television program and view it later, also referred to as “time-shifting”. This argument 
resulted in the dual purpose technical protection argument which was invoked in the case 
of Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios, Inc 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
 
7.3 The Right of Fair Use and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
 
The fair use issue is of particular importance in the digital arena due both to the ease with 
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which copies can be made and distributed, and also because of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. of 1998 (DMCA). Furthermore, the issue is of importance 
when looking at DRM and whether or not the systems can be used effectively to stop 
copyright infringement. The question which needs be asked is whether or not DRM 
systems can be utilized within a legal framework that allows appropriate access to 
protected material and to the use thereof by public consumers (Burk, 2001). In other 
words, the question can be simply rephrased to ask; can DRM systems accommodate and 
recognise fair use?  
 
Copyright holders in the recording industry have started using digital means to 
prevent piracy of their digital works. One of these means is producing CD’s that won’t 
play on computers or other digital devices. This not only contravenes fair use provisions 
but also practically prevents any use at all. Many of the CD’s manufactured with such 
anti-piracy measures will not even play on actual CD players meaning that the consumer 
is actually paying for the privilege of having no rights at all. Copyright was developed as 
and has always been meant to protect a system of rights and limitations, neither of which 
is ever absolute. What DRM and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act are doing is 
creating is a system of protections which operate in terms of the absolute rights of the 
copyright holder and the grant of rights in different circumstances to the consumer based 
upon a fee payable to the Copyright Holder.  
 
In essence what has happened is that the technological protections implemented 
go far beyond the ambit of the actual legal position laid down in copyright law. The 
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recording industry claims that they have been forced into taking such harsh actions 
because piracy has eroded the sale of CD’s and is in fact making it almost impossible for 
them to continue to produce any CD’s at all. More likely is the argument that they are 
concerned about their profit margins (as will be discussed further on in this paper) 
(Adkinson and Eisenach, 2002). In fact the rationale for the drop in CD sales has been 
mooted as being the greed of the recording industry in steadily increasing the price of 
CD’s. BBC News states in an article entitled ‘Efforts to stop music piracy pointless’ 
(British Broadcasting Corporation, 2002), that in late September of 2002, several music 
companies were fined for more than $143 million after having been found guilty of fixing 
prices. So not only are rights of fair use being eroded into non-existence, but also the 
actual paid for use of the CD is being eroded too. This is because in order to try and 
create a CD that only played on CD players and not on computers, CD manufacturers 
created a CD that was actually of inferior quality by corrupting the CD format normally 
used (Peters, 2002). What is more, last year the CD protect mechanism that Sony used on 
their release of the Celine Dion CD “A New Day” actually crashed one’s hard-drive if 
one tried to play the CD on one’s computer. Surely that is not only contrary to copyright 
legislation but should also render Sony liable for damages? Either way this is certainly 
not how WIPO envisaged the protection of digital content should be or what protection it 
should result in. In fact the music industry is becoming more and more unconcerned with 
user rights. In an article published in The Register (http://www.theregister.co.uk), that 
was based on a letter, Bertelsmann Music Group was quoted as saying, in response to a 
user complaint that the CD they had legally purchased would not play, ‘all CD’s will be 
copy protected, it’s not our problem that they won’t play on some devices, so tough.’ 
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(Lettice, 2002). Whilst EMI Germany, in response to a complaint of the same nature, 
wrote a letter to the user in which they explained the reasons for their use of such 
(extreme) measures and finished off with this gem of a statement from a customer 
relations officer ‘But we fear that these facts don’t interest you at all. Because these 
measures mean the end of free music, something that must cause you much grief.’ 
(Lettice, 2002). To add insult to injury they called the user a liar by saying that his 
statement that the CD would not play in multiple CD players ‘can, in our experience, 
only originate from the realm of fairytales.’ (Lettice 2002). This demonstrates how totally 
unconcerned the music industry is about user rights and the reason great care should be 
taken in whatever solution, technical or legislative, is proposed and implemented. As 
Lettice states about the music industry and DRM, ‘they really are looking forward to the 
day when you have no rights.’(Lettice, 2002). 
 
 Not only are the technological measures utilised flawed, but also legislative 
measures implemented thus far seem to be equally riddled with booby traps for the 
unwary and innocent user. The DMCA mooted as a brilliant solution to the concerns of 
the digital content copyright holder has created more problems than it has solved due to it 
being overly zealous in its concern for the copyright holder, especially in the area of 
technological copy protection mechanisms. 
 
7.4 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and its Anti-Circumvention Provisions 
 
The DMCA has created a law which now makes it illegal to break anti-circumvention 
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measures on your legally purchased digital content product even if the reason for such 
circumvention falls squarely within the concept of fair use and would not have been 
illegal prior to the DMCA coming into being.  Piracy is a relevant and serious concern in 
the digital arena, but digital rights protection technology and legislation seems to be 
focusing solely on the limiting of consumer rights (and the right of fair use in particular) 
(IT GlobalSecure Inc, 2002) and not on maintaining the careful balance that should exist 
between the rights of copyright holders and the rights of the users of copyright works. 
The DMCA does not stop at preventing fair use but in fact goes further to prevent even a 
method or device for breaking such technological anti-circumvention measures from 
being created should the primary purpose of the device be ‘…to enable circumvention of 
technical protection systems’ (Samuelson, 1999). 
 
 The DMCA, which deals with copyright issues arising in the digital arena, has 
two anti-circumvention provisions. The first of these provisions is a major threat to the 
user right of fair use. The second of these provisions has a major impact on fair use as 
well as on academic freedom and on innovation within the IT sector which will have a 
knock-on effect of being bad for e-commerce and the digital economy generally. The first 
provision contained within Section 1201 (a) (1) (A) the act of circumventing an anti-
circumvention technological device is prohibited. The section states that it is illegal to 
circumvent ‘a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected 
under this title.’  (17 U.S.C.A. 1201 (a) (1) (A)). This effectively removes many of the 
uses of the product as it prevents the user from being able to use the product on multiple 
devices and prevents copying of the product for personal and non-infringing uses. The 
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second provision contained in Sections 1201(a) (2) and 1201  (b) (1) both restrict the 
manufacture and provision of any device which can circumvent access controls on a 
copyrighted work and any device that circumvents a copy control mechanism. Both of 
these sections apply if the device has the primary purpose of circumventing digital 
protection technologies. These provisions provoked the ire of many people in academic 
and industrial circles mainly due to their criminalising previously non-criminal activities 
and restricting academic freedom. (cf. Felton Case). And the effect of that is that many 
activities critical to the growth of the digital economy would have been outlawed 
(Samuelson, 1999). The problem arose that those who were in control of copyrights - 
equally vocal in their support for the anti-circumvention provisions - dismissed any 
claims made about the disadvantageous effect on the digital economy and the erosion of 
fair use, as spurious and lacking any foundation in truth or actual fact supported by solid 
data.  The result of the objections to these provisions was that a closed list of exceptions 
was added to the statute. The problem with the closed list was that it contained no 
general-purpose circumvention exception. This may result in the statute continuing to 
criminalise and stifle what might have been perfectly legitimate activities.  
 
The United States Congress did heed the advice of certain opponents to the 
extremely broad nature of the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA by drafting 
certain exceptions into the provision. However, the exceptions are unclear and do not 
give any clarification to the issue of whether or not it is permissible under the DMCA to 
develop technological devices specifically for the purpose of breaking anti-circumvention 
protection measures for the sole purpose of exercising rights of fair use. This is 
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particularly worrying due to the effect that the DMCA is having in rapidly eroding user 
rights of fair use and the impact that this may have in future upon further creativity, 
notwithstanding the arguments voiced to the contrary. In an article aptly entitled ‘Beyond 
DRM: The Consumer is not the Enemy’ (IT GlobalSecure Inc, 2002) posted on the IT 
Global Secure Inc website, it is asserted that the ‘…most disturbing implication of the 
entire approach is the view that the audience (consumer) is inherently criminal.’  
 
7.5 The History and Rational for the Enactment of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act 
 
The DMCA was initially enacted due to the United States adhering to provisions of the 
World Intellectual Property (WIPO) Treaty. However, rather than having the provisions 
of WIPO being the guiding force in determining the content and breadth of the DMCA, 
the DMCA became an opportunity for copyright industries in America (and particularly 
in Hollywood) to try and assert and maintain the status quo of their profits and the IT 
sector, mainly situated in Silicon Valley, trying to oppose this monopolistic move by 
Hollywood and attempting to protect their ability to create new technology and to engage 
in lawful reverse engineering of current technology, encryption research and systems 
security tests (Samuelson, 1999). Thus what exists is “a paradigm of rights users versus 
rights holders” (Parrott, Honious et al., 2000), both diametrically opposing the point of 
view of the other. Users need to be able to access content in order to decide if they want 
to purchase such content and, in order to be able to fully enjoy the fruits of their 
purchase, to access an unprotected copy of the content so that they are able to utilise the 
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content in all of their own devices for the purposes of private and non-infringing 
enjoyment thereof. 
 
7.6 Digital Rights Management as a Property Fencing Mechanism 
  
An analogy has been drawn between the protection of intellectual property through the 
application of DRM systems to the fencing off of real estate. In the situation of the 
fencing off of land, it is clear that a public right of way over the property, owned by a 
landholder, would trump the right of the landowner to fence off his private property from 
the general public (Burk, 2001). The legal position at the time allowed the landowner to 
prevent illegitimate traversing of his/her private property and allowed the public to 
prevent illegitimate fencing off of public land. Therefore, should a person with the right 
of way come across a fence they would be legally entitled to cut such fence. In the same 
way, anti-circumvention provisions in the DMCA should operate in such a way that 
circumvention is prohibited insofar as “private land” or rights adhering solely to the 
copyright owner are concerned. However, circumvention of DRM technology should be 
considered legitimate and permitted by law in instances where public goods or rights are 
being illegally fenced off by copyright holders. 
 
As will be seen later in this paper, it is essential that some measure be introduced 
to curb the overbroad language and scope of the anti-circumvention provisions, 
particularly due to the substantial and unintended consequences that this legislation has 
and may still have on the digital economy, academic freedom and fair use. The problem 
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in the arena of the digital economy is that the technology is changing so often and so 
rapidly that it is important for the legal framework to be flexible enough to allow for 
these changes. The danger in a too restrictive and unyielding framework is that it can 




8. THE CONCERNS SURROUNDING DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT AND 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY  
 
Privacy is a flexible concept meaning different things and affording people different 
protection and rights in various situations. Privacy has become a problem in connection 
with the Internet for three reasons: 
• Undetected collection of personal data is easy to achieve (By software tools such as 
referrers, search strings, smart browsing features and web bugs. See generally 
William McGevern, Programmed Privacy Promises: P3P and Web Privacy Law 76 
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1812); 
• The interactive data medium makes web surfers more likely to divulge personal data;  
• Cookies and other tools provide a mass of useful and readily available data that other 
methods would be unable to achieve; and  
• Software is already in place on our computers which is capable of ‘reporting back to 
base’ so to speak. Microsoft’s Windows Media Player has since version 7 had a file 
which is stored and periodically this file’s contents are transmitted to Microsoft’s 
servers informing them of exactly which CD’s and DVD’s the user of the program 
accesses. This is done by means of an embedded, globally-unique identifier which 
helps create a log file that stores and sends the content information. This not only 
impinges on the user’s privacy but also totally cancels out any prospect of anonymity.  
 
In short it is easier to invade into someone’s privacy now than ever before.  
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Since privacy has become an endangered species as a result of the electronic age, it is 
useful to start by examining the core expectations of privacy that people have. 
 
8.1 Three Expectations of Privacy  
 
There are three main expectations that can be examined when one is discussing the right 
of privacy. These three expectations are: 
• the expectation of confidentiality,  
• the expectation of anonymity, and  
• the expectation of fairness and control over one’s personal information. 
 
8.1.1 The expectation of confidentiality 
 
The expectation of confidentiality typically involves the expectation that a message sent 
to a particular recipient will only be read by that intended recipient. The problem with 
this expectation and the Internet is that an unencrypted email is as vulnerable to being 
read by an unintended recipient as a postcard. Whilst the Internet’s decentralised nature 
helps it to deal with problems such as failures in computer networks by re-routing mail 
messages through an alternative network, this re-routing also leaves the messages at a 
greater risk of being intercepted (Berman, 1999). This sharing of computer networks by 
different individuals leaves messages and data sent by different users at risk to both 
exposure and corruption. 
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8.1.2 The expectation of anonymity 
 
If people do not disclose information about themselves, they have an expectation that 
their identity will remain anonymous. On the Internet, with the lack of face-to-face 
communication and the ability to transact and communicate via an alias or anonymously, 
this expectation has been more prevalent than offline. Ironically, nowhere are you less 
likely to be anonymous than on the Internet. The technology stored within the web sites 
you visit and on your own web browser routinely leaves a trail of personal information 
about you and where you have been surfing called a “clickstream” (Defined as a list of 
links requested by a site visitor). This clickstream creates a personal profile about the 
user’s online activities. Small text files known as “cookies” are stored on your computers 
hard drive to collect information about your surfing habits and store them for later use or 
retrieval by the website. These cookies have been adopted by websites to enable the 
proprietors thereof to create a portfolio of your online habits. With the globally unique 
identifier embedded in Microsoft’s Media Player, which is a standard program with 
Microsoft’s most recent Office packages, your actual digital content preferences are 
recorded, stored and relayed back to Microsoft. This has created a valuable market in 
personal profiles, of interest to both commercial bodies and government (Tessler, 2001). 
Demographic statistics gained by means of the cheap and easy technology of cookies can 
be very valuable to technology companies who are not coping with the current downturn 
in technology stocks. (A good example of this is the sale of Egghead to Fry’s Electronics 
where it was part of the terms and conditions of the sale that Egghead would sell its 
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customer list, in spite of promising not to divulge this information to a third party) 
(Wolverton, 2001).  
 
8.1.3 The expectation of fairness and control over personal information 
 
This concept is based on the premise that an individual discloses information to a third 
party for that third party’s use only and for a specific purpose. That said, it is becoming 
more and more evident that with the growing market in personal information, information 
disclosed by an individual as outlined above is routinely being transferred to other parties 
for uses other than that with which the disclosure was given. This has resulted in massive 
databases being created which collect and compile information about individuals which is 
then “mined” by a corporation for their own benefit. With the growth of the capabilities 
of technology, individuals are having less control over their personal information than 
ever before. Furthermore, not only are individuals losing control over who sees the 
information and what is done with the information, but also they are losing the ability to 




8.2 How privacy is traditionally protected 
8.2.1 The Fourth Amendment 
 
Privacy is traditionally protected by the 4th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. The Fourth Amendment provides that:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 
  In order to be afforded the protection of the Fourth Amendment, an individual 
must pass a test to establish such legitimate expectation of privacy. The individual 
must show that a) they had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and b) this 
expectation was a reasonable one. There is an important rider to this expectation of 
privacy in that it is limited:  
what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject 
of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve, even in an area accessible to 
the public, may be constitutionally protected.(Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52) 
 
8.2.2 The Common Law Tort of Invasion of Privacy 
 
The origins of the common law tort of invasion of privacy arose out of a discussion on 
the invasion of privacy by Warren and Brandeis in 1890. The authors proposed the birth 
of a common law tort based on the disclosure of private facts to the public (Brandeis, 
1890). A later review of several years of tort jurisprudence led Dean Prosser to declare 
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that the single right of privacy as enumerated by Warren and Brandeis was actually a 
conglomerate right comprising four individual components, namely: 
1) The tort of appropriation of one’s name and/or likeness for the commercial benefit of 
another, without the permission of the person; 
2) The public disclosure of private facts; 
3) The tort of intrusion into seclusion, a form of trespass; 
4) The tort of false light which protects against inferences onto the subject views and or 
circumstances that are not applicable (Prosser, 1960). 
Prosser’s seminal work on the tort of privacy resulted in its codification into the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
It is however, generally accepted that the privacy torts are inadequate to deal with 
the current problems surrounding privacy, mainly because there is little falsity of the facts 
disclosed or disseminated and most of the facts disseminated are already, in one form or 
the other, within the public domain. This however, is not to say that the privacy tort can 
play no further role in the protection of online privacy, but that it is not useful in its 
current form and/or application. 
 
8.3 The problems posed by the Internet and in particular by DIGITAL RIGHTS 
MANAGEMENT. 
 
There are several problems posed by the Internet that create new challenges for the 
protection of privacy. These problems are associated both with the manner in which 
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information is disseminated and with the technology involved in the dissemination of 
such information. It can be seen that there is an increase of data, a globalisation of 
communication across territorial boundaries together with a decentralisation, and lack of 
a central control mechanism. There is a flood of information being transmitted easily and 
rapidly to more people than was previously possible. This leaves an ever-greater quantity 
of data open to privacy infringement and the traditional mechanisms for dealing with 
privacy and ensuring privacy protection are proving to no longer be adequate or effective. 
The growth in technology and the speed with which that growth has occurred means that 
there must be an amalgamation of both legal and technical solutions in order for privacy 
to be adequately protected.  
 
These problems are inherent in DRM technologies. Current PKI protocols require 
user authentication for the simple reason that the identity of the user is required in order 
to prosecute an infringement and furthermore user tracking is part and parcel of the DRM 
package so that any fraudulent use of the digital product can be prevented. Privacy 
advocates state that this is not a necessary consequence of DRM and that consumers 
should be involved in how much tracking occurs. Utopia in this situation would be that 
all transactions are explicit and with consumer participation (Parrott, Honious et al., 
2000). What is even more worrying is that DRM could require all purchasers of media 
content to identify themselves. Thus the standard of anonymous consumption of content 
would be totally eroded and a consumer-modelling, based on consumption patterns, 
would be easily ascertained and readily sold for a profit to the highest, and certainly not 
necessarily the most scrupulous, purchaser. User profiling could also be used to prevent 
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access to certain information by certain users and/or as a means to fix prices according to 
user profiles (Yale University, 2002). Traditionally, content could be accessed and 
consumed without the disclosure and transfer of personal information. In fact there were 
statutory and ethical measures in place to ensure that this was so when one accessed 
content, for example, at the local library.  
 
8.4 Approaches to privacy protection and the Internet 
 
Whenever one looks to regulate the Internet and digital content there are two competing 
and equally compelling rights which need to be considered. These rights are the right to 
privacy and the rights involved in the accessing of information. Furthermore, there is the 
commercial need to divulge information in order to conclude transactions. After all one 
must be able to know with whom one is contracting.  
 
It is essential that a mechanism is developed which will effectively protect the 
individual’s right to privacy and ensure that it is not eroded whilst maintaining an arena 
where copyrighted information is plentiful and easily accessible by the public yet still 
providing due compensation to the holder of the copyright. These opposing approaches 
are often referred to as the libertarian approach versus the market opportunists’ (Belgum) 
approach. The former favours a free flow of information while the latter ensures privacy 
protection through stricter legal regulation. 
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The other difference in approach to privacy protection comes in the form of the 
nature of the right that is being protected under the mantle of privacy. Samuelson argues 
that the right is akin to that of a property right and thus should be treated in the same 
manner that property rights are dealt with and confer ownership of their personal data 
onto the individual. Samuelson goes further and refers to a ‘quasi-religious war to resolve 
whether the nature of a person’s interest in her personal data is a fundamental civil liberty 
or (a) commodity interest.’ (Samuelson, 2000). Others argue that privacy is a tort right 
akin the right of dignity or the tort of breach of confidence.  
 
One of the major issues with the property approach to personal data is exactly that 
it does confer ownership of facts, something that is specifically removed from the realm 
of traditional intellectual property protection. (See generally William McGevern, 
Programmed Privacy Promises: P3P and Web Privacy Law 76 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1812). A 
further problem of the property approach is that it implies transferability of ownership 
and with that ultimately a loss of control over one’s personal data, something which 
privacy rights advocates are seeking to prevent. Rather, privacy advocates would see 
one’s personal data as inalienable.  
 
Most of the solutions posed in respect of the protection of privacy are good and 
do go a long way to protecting just that. However, what is clear is that none of the DRM 
solutions, with or without privacy protection measures, go very far to protecting 
anonymity. The argument put forward by DRM advocates is that only people with 
something to hide would have a problem with not being able to consume digital copyright 
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protected material (Szynol, 2003) . This argument is very thin and totally without 
foundation, logic or merit. It is also particularly unpalatable to most liberally-minded 
people not wishing to occupy a big brother state. 
 
In this discussion of the various rights issues involved in DRM it is quite clear 
that there are competing interests at play. The next chapter will look at the various 
interest groups and the effect they are having on the debate surrounding DRM in the 
United States of America. 
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9. MONOPOLISTIC INTERESTS IN THE DEBATE SURROUNDING DIGITAL 
RIGHTS MANAGEMENT 
 
There are many interested parties involved in the debate over DRM and the protection of 
digital intellectual property rights. However, the question is whether or not these parties 
should have as much sway over the debate as they seem to have.  
 
Traditionally there has always been lobbying by various interest groups when 
legislation is proposed, however, it is not generally the particular and self-serving 
interests of the various groups that is catered for in legislation, but the accommodation of 
all the various parties so that an equitable solution is arrived at through the 
implementation of the legislation to the problem at hand.  
 
In the United States the legislative process generally works in the following way. 
The Constitution empowers federal government.  No law may conflict with the 
Constitution and any conflict between the state and federal law is governed by the 
Supremacy Clause in the Constitution.  Thus federal law enacted in terms of the 
Constitution is superior to state law. 
 
Similarly to South Africa, the American Constitution distinctly outlines and 
allows for the principle of the separation of powers. Thus the separate powers allocated to 
the executive, the judiciary and the legislature are clearly defined. The executive has the 
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power of administration and regulation; the legislature has the power to make laws; and 
the judiciary has the power to interpret the law. 
 
The separation of powers allows a system of checks and balances to be built into 
the legal and governmental system of the United States of America and South Africa. 
 
9.1 A Closer Examination of the United States’ Legislative Process 
 
The United States Constitution creates a bicameral legislature known as Congress.  
Congress is divided into two chambers, namely, the House of Representatives and the 
Senate (see Article 1, Section 1), each having equal legislative powers to create laws. In 
order for a bill to be passed to the President for signature into law, a majority approval 
must be reached in each chamber. The Senate is composed of 100 members (two 
members from each of the 50 States).  Each member is elected to the Senate for a term of 
6 years.  In contrast, the House of Representatives has 435 members, each serving 2-year 
terms. 
 
Legislation is drafted by standing committees.  Each chamber has such a 
committee to prepare legislature for approval and enactment. Legislation is introduced 
into either chamber of Congress in one of the following four manners, as a: 
• Bill (public/private) 
• Joint resolution 
• Concurrent resolution 
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• Simple resolution 
 
When a bill is introduced, it is numbered.  Once it is referred to one of the standing 
committees, the following process occurs once in front of Congress. Congress will: 
• Table/continue drafting, or 
• Hold hearings, or 
• Debate/amend, or 
• Vote. 
 
If positive vote is cast, it is referred to the other chamber.  If accepted by the other 
chamber it passes through to the president.  If it is not accepted by the other chamber it is 
referred back to the original chamber with amendments for a revote. Both houses must 
agree on a bill before it becomes enrolled for presidential action. 
 
The president is presented with a bill once it has been agreed upon by both chambers.  
He can either sign it (the bill becomes an act) or veto it. If he veto’s it, it will be returned 
to the original house with his objections. A presidential veto can be overruled by a 2/3rd 
vote of both houses. A bill is in effect also enacted by default if it is returned within 10 
days to Congress without objections – a so-called “pocket veto”. 
 
Once the President signs a law, it is given a Public Law number.  When this Public 
Law is first printed, such first printing is referred to as a Slip Law. The control and 
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preparation of laws falls into the hands of the office of the Federal Register National 
Archives Records Administration.  
 
At the end of each congressional session, the Slip Laws are collated in chronological 
order and bound together to form the US Statutes at Large. (The official publication of 
laws and resolutions enacted by Congress). 
 
The Law Revision Council of the House of Representatives prepares an official 
compilation (arranged by subject) of all permanent and general laws. This compilation is 
known as the US Code. 
 
When draft legislation is not voted through but referred back to the original House for 
debate and vote, a report is drawn up to analyse the purpose and scope of the proposed 
bill by a standing committee.  The report will shed light on the committee’s rationale in 
referring the bill back to the originating House. 
 
When standing committees feel that public input is needed, either with regard to 
outlining the need for specific legislation or to discuss controversial matters of public 
concern, a public hearing is held whereby a written statement is filed. Transcripts of such 
hearings are printed and distributed. This is normally when any aggressive lobbying by 
the various interest groups takes place. A record of congressional proceedings is 
published for each day Congress is in session. 
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9.2 Lobbying and the Legislative Process in the Argument For or Against DRM  
 
There is quite clearly a strong place for lobbying by interest groups in the process of 
legislative drafting, however, it seems that in the instance of DRM the various interest 
groups are having a powerful effect on the legislative process and the balance between 
public and private rights is getting set off-kilter. Perhaps the most worrying move is that 
by major recording industry interest groups who have stated that they will not be seeking 
government intervention in their attempts to prevent digital piracy, but are rather willing 
to enter into a compromise with the major computer companies as to how this issue 
should be resolved. This approach certainly serves the interests of these giant industry 
groups but the consumer is most certainly not going to be fairly represented, if in fact 
represented at all, by this compromise. But perhaps more sinister is the fact that a major 
industry sector is being sidelined by this compromise, namely the movie industry that has 
also been lobbying extensively for its own anti-piracy measures to be adopted (Harmon, 
2002). One must question this sudden move by the recording industry to side with the 
computer industry, thereby breaking a long history of being allied with the movie 
industry. The move quite clearly demonstrates that neither group is allied with the other 
whether by means of a common goal to be achieved or a common policy standpoint from 
which they operate. Not only has the intention of the computer and recording industries 
to enter into a compromise been publicised but also, Jack Valenti, President of the 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), has gone on record in clear opposition 
to the views propounded by the recording industry by saying that: ‘ We (the MPAA) are 
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not prepared to abandon the option of seeking technical protection measures via the 
Congress or appropriate regulatory agency, when necessary…’ (Harmon, 2002).  
 
It seems that rather than trying to find a workable solution to the problems posed 
by the digital age in the area of copyright protection, the various industry giants affected 
by DRM issues are attempting to secure themselves a monopoly in the area of copyright 
protection, be it in the means for protecting the valuable digital content or the control of 
the actual content itself. The compromise, therefore, smacks of an ousting of any and all 
parties that might threaten either the economic power of the groups or their ability to 
future dictate the process of DRM. Copyright protection has traditionally been a 
legislative protection measure designed to balance the interests of the owners of the 
copyright and the users of the copyrighted material. 
 
Hollywood itself has stated that it is not totally reliant on the technical or 
legislative protections but has also been known to engage in a little bit of “spoofing”. 
Spoofing can be termed a technical means of undermining the current technological 
measures used on peer-to-peer (P2P) networks to illegally copy and transfer digital 
content. Possibly the most famous - or infamous - of these P2P networks is that of 
Napster. However, there are a plethora of other similar systems. What Hollywood has 
allegedly taken to doing is posting incorrect information on these networks so that when 
users of the networks attempt to search for and download illegal copies they will receive 
inaccurate information and so the efficacy and accuracy of the network is undermined. 
Accordingly the users’ trust in the ability of the networks to deliver the correct goods is 
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eroded. The reason that this works is because it is very hard for P2P networks to be shut 
down. In order to prevent legal liability, P2P systems rely on a very loose system of 
control, especially as far as controlling the actual content that is uploaded onto the 
system. In order for any network to eliminate the problem posed by spoofing they would 
have to build greater controls into what goes onto the system and thus create an increased 
means for holding the creators of the P2P network legally accountable. 
 
But even in the face of Hollywood’s purported lack of desire to rely on technical 
solutions, it has recently been using technical measures designed by the software giants 
like Microsoft to protect its copyright interests. Enter the copyright protection tools 
known as DRM. In its use of DRM, Hollywood will essentially not be selling a product to 
the consumer but a license to use the product in a specified manner. This has been touted 
by Hollywood as a massive benefit to the consumer because it will allow an adaptable 
license to use to be delivered as opposed to a one size fits all type of license. But this so-
called bespoke license actually limits the consumer’s traditional rights in terms of 
copyright law. Users of DRM software claim that it enables a plethora of business models 
to emerge (Harmon, 2003). The question looms though, what will the expense to the 
consumer be? This type of business model raises the issues of pay-per-use billing which 
has been demonstrated above to reduce the consumer’s traditional fair use rights. 
 
Unfortunately, Hollywood itself does not seem to be sure of how they want to 
implement DRM. In an incisive article posted on the LawMeme website entitled 
“Hollywood’s Short-sighted Follies” (Miller, 2002), Hollywood’s recent efforts to 
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persuade Congress to pass legislation that will require DRM  into all aspects of the digital 
arena are discussed.  Not only will this result in Microsoft being afforded certainly a 
temporary monopoly in this area as its DRM software already incorporates most of the 
regulations mooted, but also any innovative developments by competitors to Microsoft in 
this area would be subdued. There is an old saying that Hollywood and all other self-
interested industry players in this debate would be well advised to heed, be careful what 
you wish for…it may have consequences which were not intended and are hard to 
reverse. As DRM is already going beyond the ambit of the law and in effect is becoming 
a new kind of law in the arena of copyright protection in digital products, imagine a 
world where Microsoft becomes the new lawmaker through the use of one of its DRM 
packages like Palladium. This could be very real if limits on consumer behaviour are 
built into the technical standards governing new technology because the technical 
standards will become, in effect, new law. Copyright holders will in essence be able to 
create their own intellectual property law through codification, not in statute, but in a 
software or hardware design. The decision can effectively be made by creators of DRM 
software and copyright holders as to what users can or cannot do with their purchased 
product, irrespective of copyright law. The implications of this are frightening and very 
real in the face of a possible situation of dialogue and détente between the music and 
computer industries, as they seek to find a solution in the absence of legislative input 
(Burk, 2001).  
 
Valenti feels that Silicon Valley is to blame for the purported drop in the sales 
revenue of the Motion Picture Association of America (due to their building and 
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development of devices which facilitate illegal copying) and accordingly feels that DRM 
software solutions are the least that computer manufacturers can do (Lessig, 2002). He in 
fact goes further to suggest that Congress should pass legislation compelling computer 
manufacturers to build so-called ‘theft-proof machines’ (Lessig, 2002). Valenti believes 
that the computer industry has no interest in self-regulation on this front stating that what 
is needed is a ‘cleansing redemption’ (Lessig, 2002) apparently best afforded by federal 
regulation. Lessig makes an interesting point in the article he writes discussing this 
particular debate. Hollywood was loath for Congress to intervene in any regulation of the 
content that they showed on television, spouting forth on the rights enshrined in the 
constitution and the privilege these rights afforded them to program according to market 
forces. The irony of this is perfectly summed up by Lessig when he states that 
‘Apparently the souls of America’s youth don’t justify regulation, but protecting 
Hollywood’s profit does.’ (Lessig, 2002). Possibly the most important statement made 
though was by Vadasz, founder and vice president of Intel: ‘To inject regulatory process 
into the design of [computer] products will irreparably damage the high-tech 
industry…Congress should instead be listening to the consumer…. and be the consumer’s 
voice.’(Lessig, 2002). 
 
The very same debate raged around the development of the VCR. (cf. The earlier 
argument of a device having a substantial non-infringing use). Once again, and equally 
vitriolic in his descriptions, Valenti described the VCR as ‘the Boston Strangler of the 
American film industry’ (Lessig, 2002). Congress in this instance rebalanced the law to 
accommodate the development of technology with the dual technology doctrine. Now, 
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industry players are acting with very short memories and instead of requesting that the 
law once more be re-looked at to accommodate the technological developments of the 
last 20 years, they are fighting to protect their market share from natural competition 
brought about by burgeoning technological developments and are now asking Congress 
to instead force technology backwards. Congress would be well advised to examine the 
motivation behind the lobbying for regulation of the digital device and PC industry. 
Lessig agrees that a problem does exist with new content in an unprotected form, but he 
states that law, and not code, should protect this content. Consumer rights of fair use 
should always be considered and protected. He goes further to state that “Copyright Laws 
should of course give artists and creators an adequate return for their creativity; but they 
should not become a tool for dinosaurs to protect themselves against evolution.” (Lessig, 
2002). 
 
After having looked at DRM, its function and purpose, the effect it is having in 
the United States and the vicious debate between the various interest groups that has 
ensued, this essay now seeks to look at the applicability of DRM to South Africa. The 
following chapters will look at whether DRM is currently a problem in South Africa, 
whether South Africa should be concerned about the issues surrounding DRM and if so, 
what the approach taken should be. This is an area of law that has not undergone much 
rigorous discussion and analysis at all. The approach of the writer has therefore been to 
look at the social and economic situation in South Africa, the regulatory environment 
surrounding law and information and communications technology and compare this to 
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the situation arising in the United States. Conclusions are drawn from the writer’s 
perception of what the issues are likely to be with regard to DRM in South Africa. 
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10. THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION: WHY IS IT DIFFERENT? 
 
DRM does not appear to be the issue on the forefront of people’s minds when the impact 
of digital advancement is discussed in South African circles. Does this mean that we do 
not need to be concerned about DRM? And if not, why should we be concerned and how 
pressing should our concern be? 
 
There is no single answer to the questions raised about DRM. Firstly, as the 
digital economy does not so easily confine itself to traditional jurisdictional borders, 
South Africa certainly needs to be concerned about activity in this regard in Europe and 
the United States of America. Secondly, as the trend has demonstrated, the development 
of digital technology, its impact on law and society and the problems associated therewith 
in the United States of America have inevitably seemed to follow to South Africa in time. 
South Africa certainly does need to be concerned about DRM for the simple reason that 
although currently only having any real impact in the United States in the movie and 
recording industry, the impact of DRM is going to grow to the protection of any valuable 
digital content transferred over digital networks and thus its application is virtually 
limitless. But is digital piracy going to prove to be a major issue in South Africa? This is 
questionable for reasons which we will look at below, namely the differences in the legal 
framework and that of bandwidth and the telecommunications system in South Africa. 
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10.1 The Legal Framework in South Africa Surrounding the Issue of Digital Rights  
 
The legal framework in South Africa surrounding the protection of intellectual property, 
in this instance copyright protection, and digital communications is governed by a 
number of pieces of legislation, in particular the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 and the 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, No 25 of 2002. Perhaps more 
important in the South African situation is the regulatory framework governing the 
telecommunications network.  
 
10.2 Social and Economic Realities in South Africa 
 
Since the rapid growth and absorption of the Internet into everyday life, be it for reasons 
of social, economic or political inequalities in South Africa, the historical divide between 
those who have and those who have not has been highlighted. In the burgeoning arena of 
information and communications technologies, this divide or gap has been nominated as 
the digital divide (Gillwald, 2001). The regulatory framework therefore should take into 
account alleviating the problem that this divide can cause insofar as widening the gap 
between the haves and the have-nots is concerned. In addition, furthering South Africa’s 
ability to capitalize on the access to markets and utilisation of new technologies that an 
efficient information and communications system can provide in their interaction with the 
global economy and especially that of the developed world. However, and particularly 
due to the socio-political climate in South Africa and the heightened awareness of the 
need to address past imbalances and to guard against possible future imbalances caused 
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by an inequitable socio-economic situation in the past, South Africa must also strive to 
create an information and telecommunications system that is both equitable and 
accessible. Thus one of the issues that must arise in this debate is that of broadband.  
 
10.3 Bandwidth and its impact on the Digital Economy 
 
Broadband can be defined in simplistic terms as any technological means allowing the 
rapid transfer of large amounts of information, be it in the form of text, audio, video or 
data. In the context of this thesis, the important characteristic of broadband is that it 
allows vast quantities of digital content to be transferred rapidly, and in the context of 
South Africa at a cheaper rate than is currently offered by telecommunications licensees.  
 
There are broadly five infrastructural requirements for piracy to be able to occur in 
the case of a peer-to-peer network. These are: 
1. Facilities for injecting new objects into the network utilised for piracy (input); 
2. A distribution network that carries copies of objects to users (transmission); 
3. Devices which allow users to consume the objects (output); 
4. A search mechanism to enable users to find objects (database); 
5. A storage facility that allows the objects to be retained for an extended period of 
time (Biddle, England et al.). 
This is where South Africa’s bandwidth issues make a difference. 
 
 51
The United States Telecommunications Act of 1996, section 706(c)(1) defines in 
its content, advanced telecommunications ability as “the High-Speed [meaning upload 
and download speeds of over 200mb per second], switched, broadband 
telecommunications facility that enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, 
data, graphics and video telecommunications using any technology.” From this we can 
deduce that broadband capabilities of a network imply that the network has advanced 
capabilities and having such, are thus also convergence networks.  
 
Convergence is a term used to depict the blurring of the traditional defining lines 
between what was traditionally broadcasting and telecommunications (Gillwald, 2001). It 
also, in the opinion of the writer, refers to the removal of the dividing line between the 
technologies used in order to facilitate both broadcasting and telecommunications. Where 
once a television would have been used to pick up and display broadcast signals and a 
telephone would have been used to pick up and transmit telecommunications signals, 
now a personal computer and even a mobile telephone can perform both functions. So 
there is a technological convergence that, in order to be fully appreciated and enjoyed, 
requires a network upon which it can flow, which brings us full circle back to broadband 
and “convergence” networks. 
 
In the United States of America, the body in charge of regulation of 
telecommunications and broadcasting, the Federal Communications Commission, 
assumed the position of proactively encouraging the growth of broadband and in fact 
facilitating the implementation of broadband amongst the public (Federal 
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Communications Commission, 1999). They thus took an executive decision not to 
regulate the use of broadband in an attempt to foster competition and encourage growth 
and acceptance of the new technology into the economy and public use.  
 
Is this the best solution for South Africa whose socio-economic reality is vastly 
different to that of the United States of America? It has been argued that in terms of 
market realities for countries with a strong history of monopolistic control and ownership 
in the telecommunications and broadcasting industries (and it is more often than not the 
infrastructures which are owned by these industries will have to be utilized by the 
broadband networks in order for them to be affordable) regulation is imperative in order 
to prevent free market competition degenerating into the furthering of existing 
monopolistic interests, thereby perpetuating a system not effective in self-regulation. As 
Gillwald states in the article Convergence and Broadband Implications for South Africa 
(Gillwald, 2001):  
Despite many regimes, especially in developed economies, espousing market self-regulation as the 
catalyst for broadband services, evidence from around the world strongly indicates that the 
introduction of competition and market access to broadband or other services is worth nothing 
without regulation. 
 
 It is important to note, however, that there is a vast difference between regulation 
and over-regulation by government. South Africa’s telecommunications regulations have 
a notable tendency to facilitate monopolistic structures and these structures have a 
marked government interest and shareholding.  
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10.4 The Solution for South Africa? 
 
In the light of the historical situation surrounding telecommunications in South Africa, 
the issue is perhaps not whether to regulate but how and whom to regulate. It is 
imperative that Telkom’s monopoly stranglehold over the telecommunications system in 
South Africa is loosened so that the lifeblood of new technologies can flow into a system 
so desperately in need of a transfusion rather than being diverted back into the bodies 
affecting the stranglehold.  
 
10.4.1 The Telecommunications Act, No103 of 1996 
 
The legislation governing telecommunications in South Africa is the 
Telecommunications Act, Act No. 103 of 1996.  This Act ushered in a new era in South 
Africa of a more equitable and competitive market surrounding the telecommunications 
industry. Although, that said, the Act is totally unworkable and inadequate in the area of 
rapidly expanding telecommunications especially in light of the issues of convergence 
and accordingly the need to rethink the separation between broadcasting licensing and 
telecommunications licensing. The Act and the concordant Amendment Bill of 2001 (The 
Telecommunications Amendment Bill 2001) created a regulatory body, currently the 
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa, to govern issues relating to 
telecommunications such as licensing and how such licenses would operate.  
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This all seems like a very good idea in the context of South Africa which has been 
operating with a monopolistic incumbent for too long. However, and although this hasn’t 
been thoroughly tested, in light of the initial purpose of the establishment of a regulatory 
body separate from government, the major stumbling block for this new legislation is the 
fact that there is far too great a degree of Ministerial authority and governance issues 
which should be dealt with by the regulatory body that are actually being dealt with by 
the Minister of Communications. The net effect of this creation of Ministerial decision-
making, above that of the regulatory body, is to result in the Independent 
Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) being effectively hamstrung in any 
effective and necessary transformation of the current telecommunications system. 
 
10.4.2 Regulation, Telkom and Monopolistic Control 
 
 The purpose stated in the Memorandum of Objects of the Telecommunications 
Amendment Bill, 2001 is that it creates “…the legal framework for the South African 
telecommunications landscape following the end of Telkom’s exclusivity period…to 
bring it in line with technological, regulatory and industry developments over the past 
five years in South Africa and comparable international jurisdictions.”  However, this is 
in essence totally contradicted in the clause 2.9 that follows which deals with the 
decision-making process on application for a license. This clause relates to the current 




in accordance with international best practice, the Bill confirms the presumed validity of licensing 
decisions pending litigation related to such decisions, such that litigation does not delay the licensing 
process. The Minister is empowered to properly access the recommendation by the Authority and either 
accept, reject or alternatively request further information or clarification from the Authority in relation to a 
recommended applicant. The main aim is to eliminate the previous limitations to the Minister’s ability to 
address the Authority’s recommendations to the extent of fully applying his or her mind.   
 
Obviously the importance of a limitation on Ministerial Power and the need for 
this power to remain with ICASA has eluded the government, or possibly it is just such 
an effect that they sought to achieve. Government has decided that it will decide who 
does or does not get a license and this power it has attempted to write into the legislation 
in the form of the amendment bill (All Africa News Inc, 2002). In effect they are in the 
process of eroding and usurping the powers allocated to ICASA in terms of the 
Telecommunications Act. Although with the Initial Public Offering of Telkom shares to 
the public it would seem that government interest in Telkom and its monopoly would be 
lessened, it may not be so. In fact it would seem that in order to make Telkom more 
successful in its offering of shares to the public, the government has protected its own 
interests in trying for as long as possible to prevent the dilution of Telkom’s monopoly 
whilst attempting to maintain the appearance of divesting itself of its interest in Telkom 
and of opening up the telecommunications system in South Africa to competition for the 
benefit of the public and the economy. Furthermore, Government has insisted that every 
step taken, both in terms of drafting and applying telecommunications legislation, has 
been after ascertaining best practice in international jurisdictions. I do not dispute that 
Government may well have delved into best practice as it is defined internationally in this 
arena, but I do believe that this has been done to the detriment of South Africa, both in 
terms of the economy and in terms of provision of service to the public, in that very few 
of the developed telecommunications jurisdictions have for so long had a monopoly 
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power, linked to government, with total say over the regulation and application of the 
telecommunications system and as to ownership of the system both in terms of service 
delivery and infrastructure. In fact, as was demonstrated above, the Federal 
Communications Commission in the United States has adopted the stance that regulation 
is not desirable in the arena of telecommunications especially surrounding the issues of 
convergence and broadband. The United Kingdom, whilst still maintaining the distinction 
between telecommunications and broadcasting, not yet collapsing the distinction, does 
recognize that premature regulation or over-regulation could result in a retardation of 
growth in an area of great economic importance. Canada has attempted to avoid 
regulation surrounding broadband in particular as well, feeling, like the United Kingdom, 
that regulation prior to understanding the exact impact and effect of this technology 
would be detrimental to the telecommunications industry as a whole.  
 
The important point to reap from this situation is that the telecommunications 
regulatory is not in itself bad, but that an independent regulatory body should have the 
final decision and that such decisions should be made carefully and with cognizance of 
the impact they could have on a growth industry. The fact is that regulation is often 
mooted as a possible panacea for the prevention of monopolistic control in a nascent 
environment, and yet in an ironic twist in South Africa this is exactly what regulation is 
perpetuating. What is patently clear is that the development of broadband is essential for 
the development of the information and communications industry in South Africa if it is 
to stay in line with international developments: this in itself is necessary for the South 
African economy to develop further. Not in the least because massive foreign investment 
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is needed for the development of the telecommunications infrastructure in this country 
and without the unbundling of Telkom’s monopoly regime and the provision of fair 
licenses for broadband networks and associated wireless technologies, the lack of 
confidence in the situation will do nothing to attract the investment and everything to 
erode investment in South Africa. 
 
10.5 The Effect of a Lack of Effective or Sufficient Bandwidth in South Africa 
 
In the arena of innovative technologies and the products that surround them, the 
regulatory environment can, unwittingly often, determine the success or otherwise of the 
technology and products. The regulatory environment in South Africa is important for the 
discussion surrounding DRM as, without the access to a telecommunications and Internet 
infrastructure for massive amounts of data to be transferred digitally across digital 
networks at a reasonable cost to the majority of the population, the issues concerning 
owners of valuable digital content will not emerge as people simply will not have the 
means to “rip-off” someone else’s intellectual property and valuable content. Recently an 
internet speed record was set transferring 6.7 gigabytes of data over 10 978 kilometers 
from Sunnyvale in the United States to Amsterdam in Holland. It took less than 60 
seconds (cf. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/2822333.stm).  Accepting that the 
average United States user would not have bandwidth of this capability, the average 
speed of a home broadband connection in the United States would be approximately 3500 
times slower (Stevenson, 2003). The average dial-up modem speed for transferring data 
in South Africa is not even comparable being a dial-up connection without broadband 
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and so is much slower than even the average broadband connectivity in the United States. 
When you consider that, for example, most DVD’s are 3.4 gigabytes in size, it is unlikely 
due both to the instability of the network and the time involved (and thus accordingly the 
cost of the telephone call) that a large amount of people in South Africa would rather pay 
for valuable content than pirate it as, aside from any moral issues and on a purely 
economic analysis based on actual cost and transactional cost, it would work out easier 
and cheaper for most consumers. 
 
It is worth noting that third world DRM is something to prepare for and perhaps 
we should take advantage of the time lag between South Africa and the United States, to 
learn from their experiences and to decide what technologies to adopt.  Right now the 
adoption of CD and DVD technology is unlikely to change and the mass import of mass-
produced (in China for example) CD’s and DVD’s being sold at flea markets is a far 
greater threat to copyright issues.  Although this issue has not been studied or tested yet, 
the writer is of the opinion that DRM itself is going to have a larger influence on 
government issues such as the revamp of the national identity card system to provide all 
citizens with a digital identity documents. This is more an issue of the privacy and rights 
side of DRM  (for example what happens to illegal aliens) the media issue, i.e. the 
concerns surrounding pirating of CD’s and DVD’s is most likely going to be pushed 
aside as technology companies push new player standards down into the market. In fact it 
is important to realize that a significant number of people in South Africa still use analog 
tapes and not yet CD’s. 
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11. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
 
In the discussion of the possible solutions, most analysis and exploration will be 
undertaken with regard to the situation in the United States. This being mainly because 
the United States is at the forefront of the DRM debate and the debate is currently 
undergoing numerous transformations and is growing more and more heated. It is most 
likely that any DRM solution will likely emerge from within the United States and 
furthermore, it is also most likely that the rest of the world will be guided by the 
developments there. There is no strikingly obvious or single solution presenting itself in 
the United States at current but there are many steps being taken by various interest 
groups to resolve the need to protect valuable digital content whilst still balancing the 
equally compelling needs to guarantee a protection of privacy and the right of fair use to 
the consumer. 
 
What is clear is that any solutions will have to be careful not to over-regulate 
while clarifying the situation with regard to user rights, especially that of fair use which 
will have to be entrenched in whatever solution is adopted or tried out, be it technological 
or legislative. 
 
In the United States of America there have been moves by industry, both through 
technological measures to lobby for legislative assistance or to adopt a solution through 
negotiation. Currently, the most interesting have been a series of Bills in front of 
Congress which seem to seek to amend the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 
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11.1 The Digital Choice and Freedom Act (DCFA) 
 
The Digital Choice and Freedom Act of 2002 is an attempt to rectify the erosion of fair 
use rights that seems to be occurring through the application of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act and in the interpretation of other copyright legislation. The Bill seeks to 
amend USC section 107 of title 17 to incorporate digital works into the sections dealing 
with fair use (Ruiz, 2002). What is even more critical perhaps, is the fact that the Bill also 
amends section 123 of title 17 of the USC so that making a copy of a digital work for 
non-public display of the digital work or non-public performance thereof work on a 
digital media device, provided that the person effecting the copying and utilizing the copy 
is in possession of a lawfully purchased product. This basically allows digital works to 
fall within the traditional fair use provisions of copyright legislation (Ruiz, 2002). What 
is important is not only that this type of copying would no longer be an infringement of 
copyright law but that it would invalidate attempts by music and/or the film industry to 
force purchasers of digital products to accept unfair and unduly restrictive license terms 
by rendering the licenses unenforceable and therefore invalid. 
 
In fact it seems that one of the intentions of Representative Zoe Lofgren in 
introducing this Bill was to put the spotlight on harsh and limiting licensing conditions 
and to render them subject to public and legislative scrutiny (Fleming Phillips, 2002). 
The main impact of this on DRM would be that a creator of content attempting to restrict 
the transfer of such content to a digital device would not be able to do so by merely 
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amending various licensing terms and conditions. This would, in a sense, limit the 
efficacy or attractiveness of DRM as a package to protect digital content. This is good for 
the consumer but bad for companies such as Microsoft and the producers of creative 
digital content. The writer is not sure if this is the type of redress that is needed as the 
writer is uncertain if this achieves the balance required in copyright issues. This Bill also 
suggests that the right incorporated in the first sale doctrine of traditional copyright 
materials is developed to include digital copyright materials. This doctrine allows that a 
valid owner of purchased copyright material may sell their rights to such validly 
purchased material provided that no copy of the work, be it for use or backup, remains 
with the original owner. In terms of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act this would be 
restricted as it would often require transferral by means of copying the digital work. 
 
11.2 A Balancing Act 
 
The main problem with the measures introduced by DRM and legislation surrounding the 
protection of DRM is that the balance has swung too far in favour of the copyright 
holder. So where previously it was a case of the consumer being innocent until proven 
guilty, it is now the case that every consumer is treated as if they are guilty. No 
alternative. The question that needs to be addressed and satisfactorily answered is that of 
how to prevent and punish piracy without treating every consumer as a felonious 
pirate(Ruiz, 2002). The DCFA does attempt to achieve this balance. Section 1201 of title 
17 of the DMCA is amended and deals with the notorious anti-circumvention provisions. 
What this section tries to achieve is the right to circumvent technological measures 
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designed to prevent copying, if the copying one intends to engage in would otherwise be 
legal but for the anti-circumvention provisions in the DMCA. This Bill is by no means 
flawless, but it is laudable in its attempts to enshrine the fair use doctrine in any measure 
intended to protect digital copyrighted content, be it by means of technological or 
legislative measures. Fair use must be protected in order for the traditional balance 
between copyright holders and copyright users to be maintained and this balance is 
necessary for the copyright system to be effective, fair and long lived.  
 
On the technological side, RealNetworks Inc, a software company and competitor 
to Microsoft, has recently released its proprietary code for the Helix DNA Server which 
will essentially enable people to send and receive digital media safely(Reuters Inc, 2003). 
A major reason for this initiative on their part was to prevent Microsoft from obtaining a 
further monopoly in the area of DRM. This was in essence to prevent Microsoft 
potentially owning all the DRM, which is a worrying issue when one considers that DRM 
could in effect be the “owner” or certainly controller of a vast amount of copyrighted 
digital content. 
 
As a matter of policy, it is critical that copyright protection in respect of digital 
media is afforded sufficient protection. That is undisputed and recognized as a valuable 
and necessary measure to be taken in order to ensure that creativity is protected and 
rewarded. However, how this is done is critical and the debate at the moment tends to 
revolve around the “how we should” rather than the “should we” question. In a speech by 
FCC Chairman, Powell, it was stated that: ‘Much of the broadband-intensive content that 
 63
is likely to be the core of broadband applications is in the hands of major copyright 
holders that are unlikely to make it widely available without stringent protections and a 
way to profit from its distribution. This will take some hard work and time.’ (Adkinson 
and Eisenach, 2002). This demonstrates that aside from rewarding creativity, big business 
will need to be assured that the marketplace is viable and profitable on a sustainable 
basis. This is understandable. No business is going to put effort into developing a system 
that will ultimately be of no benefit to them financially. Moreover, this protection needs 
to be carefully balanced against the need for the digital economy to be widely accepted 
and for digital products to be more rapidly disbursed.  It is mooted that perhaps the best 
approach to the problem is not to consider serious amendments to current legislation, 
neither to impose restrictions on technology nor enforce building into technology DRM 
packages, but for the copyright holders themselves to analyse their business models and 
attempt to derive a model designed on a new paradigm that will both encourage the 
adoption of digital technology and media whilst at the same time protecting their 
interests. Owners of the copyrighted works would argue that the consumer is too 
unreliable and dishonest and that they would never cover their costs sufficiently for there 
to be any motivation for artists or creators to continue creating. Users of copyright 
protected works would argue that the copyright holders, especially when copyright 
resides not with the creator but with big industry (which is so often the case), are merely 
greedy and attempting to enlarge their ever increasing profit margin. The music and film 
industries have been claiming that their profits have decreased by about 10% due to 
piracy. The truth of the matter is that the American economy has been reduced by 10% 
over the last year due to a recession. The film and music industries have for too long had 
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excessive profits. In the music industry this had been due to the fact that the cost of 
producing a compact disc was initially quite high and so the sale price too was quite high, 
but while this cost of production dropped rapidly, the sale price has remained the same. 
The music industry could be viewed as pirates themselves. In fact it has been posited that 
as long as the margin between sale price of an item and the cost to produce such item is 
so large, as in the case of music compact discs, there will always be a market for pirates 
and so piracy shall thrive in this enlarged profit margin. Not necessarily a defense to 
digital piracy but perhaps an explanation of why it is so rife. So many consumers who do 
pirate material state that they would actually prefer to pay for the use of the digital rights 




11.3 Recent Bills Presented to Congress 
 
Currently there are two important and quite diverse Bills sitting before Congress, 
representing two different points of views, which fairly accurately seem to represent the 
views espoused in the paragraph above.  
 
11.3.1 The Music Online Competition Act 
 
The Music Online Competition Act requires copyright holders of music to license on a 
more equitable and in a less self-interested manner. In explanation, there is a strong 
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history of allegiance between music distributors and copyright holders. This is not an 
allegiance formed out of loyalty but out of an interest in the profit-making ability of the 
music distributor, normally a factor of their ability to distribute music more effectively 
than their competitors. Copyright holders often will have an equity share in the music 
distribution company (here we see the self-interest emerging) and thus have more than a 
casual interest in the success of the company: they have a direct financial interest. The 
music copyright holder will thus tend to provide licensing rights to distribute their 
copyrighted material on more favorable terms than they would to competitor music 
distribution companies. This is not good for the industry because once again it 
encourages and fosters a monopolistic environment which neither benefits industry 
growth nor innovation. This Bill requires a type of compulsory licensing. Compulsory 
licensing in itself is nothing unusual. In fact there are have been several instances in 
which governmental agencies have required that compulsory licenses be awarded, be it in 
the pharmaceutical, music or any other intellectual property-driven industry. What is 
unusual about this Bill is that it does not have reference to any governmental agency or 
legislative directive. Rather, the licensing terms which will become compulsory should 
this Bill be passed will be drawn from existing or new licensing agreements entered into 
with the music distributors “allied” to the copyright holders. 
 
11.3.2 The Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act  
 
The second Bill sitting before congress is the Consumer Broadband and Digital 
Television Promotion Act. This Bill, when presented to Congress, caused a great deal of 
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discussion, not all of it complimentary. The Bill requires that all digital media devices 
carry standard security devices. These would prevent piracy. The Bill would also make it 
illegal for consumers to tamper with such devices. This smacks of the DMCA anti-
circumvention provisions, security devices and prohibitions in place to prevent 
consumers attempting to override such protection mechanisms. The difference in this Bill 
is that there is a clear and explicit reference made to user rights, specifically the fair use 
provisions of copyright law. It is made quite clear that the mandatory security measures 
to prevent digital piracy shall not erode and render valueless a consumers rights of fair 
use. This limitation on the exclusive rights of the copyright holder is a step in the right 
direction, albeit one small step (Adkinson and Eisenach, 2002). This Bill demonstrates 
quite clearly a technological solution enforced by legislation. The problem with this Bill 
is that it could be creating a monopoly in who owns the DRM. Microsoft currently has 
operating systems on the market which already incorporate DRM applications, be it in 
their .Net or Palladium ventures. This of course all rests on the supposition that DRM and 
not a straight technical solution will be what is used. The question as to which route is 
followed will depend more on at which end the rights are protected than anything else. If 
the rights of copyright are protected on the device itself and incorporated into the device 
prior to sale thereof, it is likely that the solution will be a technical one. If the user is 
required to have certain software installed on their digital media device in order to access 
certain digital media then the solution will more likely be one of straight DRM. Of course 
a monopoly situation could arise even if the solution is a technical solution. Current press 
has shown that Sony and Phillips are in the process of buying a software company called 
InterTrust (InterTrust Inc, 2002). InterTrust claims to be the true patent holder of most of 
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the DRM software that Microsoft has in place in its most recent operating systems and 
applications. In other words, instead of Microsoft and the computer industry being the 
monopolistic driving force in DRM, perhaps the portable telecommunications industry 
will be the owner of the DRM. Frankly, neither of these situations is particularly 
satisfactory for the consumer nor for a balanced solution for DRM and copyrights in the 
digital millennium. In fact allowing a monopoly on DRM would be in effect allowing a 
one or maybe a few major industries to control DRM and so control the information and 
content distributed across digital networks protected by such DRM. It has been asserted 
by some that this could in essence be deemed to be tantamount to private totalitarianism. 
The leap, and perhaps such leap could be considered a quantum leap, is that this could 
allow DRM to be manipulated to become a political tool. This is especially so if DRM 
becomes embedded in all computer systems, as DRM can and does function as a type of 
surveillance facility, thus the issues with privacy and DRM. When stated like that, DRM 
can if not carefully implemented, begin to smack too much of an Orwellian Big Brother. 
This is a criticism that has been leveled at Microsoft for their Palladium system. But not 
all computer companies feel the same way about DRM. In fact until DRM sufficiently 
sophisticated to be able to recognize issues such as privacy and fair use, it is better not to 
use it at all. Apple Computing actually is working on a DRM package although they have 
not implemented it with any of their other software applications. Apple in fact is seen to 
encourage using computers to promote creativity and their advertising campaign actually 
instructs consumers to “Rip, mix, burn…after all it’s your music” (Lessig, 2001). In order 
to do this, one needs broadband. And lots of it. In fact, it is being seen that the availability 
of illegal digital content is in fact driving consumer demand for broadband. It is no use to 
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the consumer if the content is available but their bandwidth capabilities prevent them 
from being able to effectively download any of the content. This is not to say that the 
writer thinks broadband should be made available in order to facilitate digital piracy, but 
merely demonstrates one of the reasons why the writer feels South Africa does not yet 
have a major problem with digital piracy and accordingly does not yet have a pressing 
need for DRM. Given that this issue is a relatively new topic and has not had much legal 
scrutiny in South Africa, there is no literature supporting this view. However, and in light 
of the way problems in this area have progressed in the United States, the writer feels that 
should the issue of bandwidth and Internet connectivity be resolved, the problem would 





Now that we know what the issues are, and the various interest groups informing 
these issues, we have a better idea of what is at stake and how difficult it is going to be to 
determine a satisfactory, workable and relatively lasting (in technological terms) solution 
to the problems posed in copyright law for digital copyrighted content. We know that 
there needs to be a shift in policy and a revisiting of the legislation. In the United States 
this revisiting may require a great deal of amendment to current legislation which deals 
with digital copyright. In South Africa, it is more the regulatory and legislative 
framework that will need a drastic re-look in order to deal with issues such as bandwidth 
and convergence of broadcasting and telecommunications; issues which are intimately 
connected to digital copyright and the ability to actually access digital content. South 
Africa certainly will need to assess the copyright legislation to determine whether or not 
it is felt that the legislation is robust enough to deal with digital technologies, or whether 
an amendment should be drafted to deal specifically with the digital medium. This is 
especially true in light of the fact that South Africa has addressed a number of electronic 
law issues in other legislation, such as the most recent Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act of 2002, but has chosen to leave the copyright issues until the end. 
South Africa, as a signatory to the World Intellectual Property Organisation, also needs to 
address the Copyright Treaty requirements, which could be done relatively easily with a 
few minor changes to the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. 
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The whole area of digital rights is fraught with conflicting issues. There is the 
pressing need to create an environment where the digital economy will be easily accepted 
and will take root and flourish. Within this broader objective there is the need for a 
balance between copyright holder’s rights and those of the copyright user, namely the 
rights of fair use, the first sale doctrine and the privacy rights of the individual. 
Furthermore, none of this will be possible without the correct regulatory framework and 
infrastructure surrounding the telecommunications and broadcasting industry. The reason 
it is so difficult to find a workable solution is, aside from the various interests that need to 
be addressed, the fact that in a rapidly changing environment such as the technological 
environment, it would be advisable for all legislators and proponents of regulated 
technological solutions to tread carefully. Nobody wants a solution to be developed and 
put through the rigor of acceptance via legislative or regulatory means only to have it be 
rendered useless by a new technology in two years’ time. (And perhaps more realistically 
in this environment, in six months’ time.) Property rights need to be clearly defined in 
this area. Furthermore, there is a danger that cryptographic or DRM systems used in the 
here and now to protect current or past intellectual property, even that which is already in 
the public domain and should not be DRM protected, might at some later stage become 
defunct and unusable in a new technological interface environment (which is not totally 
inconceivable). If this happens, and if the mechanism used to protect valuable content 
actually becomes the cage holding the value and the key is no longer working or has been 
lost, there is the danger that valuable intellectual property and information could be lost 
to future generations. This may seem extreme and possibly merely scaremonger tactics 
employed by proponents of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, but it is something that 
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should be looked at when determining a solution involving DRM. One of the problems is 
the way copyright is being viewed in the digital arena. It is being seen as a property right 
akin to that of owning a physical object when traditionally copyright has been viewed as 
more of a personal right. Copyright is being manipulated and constrained so that it begins 
to act as a tool for maintaining the status quo of the business models (hear profit margins) 
of large industry rather than as a mechanism to reward creators for their creative efforts. 
In the past a solution to upheavals has been to wait and see how the situation pans out and 
deal with it on a piecemeal basis rather than running in guns blazing and reforming the 
whole copyright system. The reason that this approach may not be taking off is due to the 
nature of the digital environment and its impact on society. Never before have the media 
industry’s rights been so challenged by the development of a new technology. So what is 
agreed is that a solution does need to be found. What is also agreed is that such solution 
must broker a compromise between user rights and rights of the copyright holder. What is 
not certain is whether the solution should be technical, legislative or both in conjunction 
with each other. The writer does believe that there does need to be a legislative element 
to the solution but this must be minor and more in the form of amending existing 
copyright legislation so that it equally gives copyright holders the tools to protect and 
enforce their rights of copy against potential digital pirates. It must also entrench user 
rights such as fair use. Furthermore, legislative measures need to be taken to address the 
potential for privacy invasion posed by DRM systems such as Microsoft’s Palladium. 
These controls need to be strict enough to constrain even the state from abusing the 
information that these systems could obtain to further their own interests. Finally, and 
very importantly for South Africa, the regulatory infrastructure surrounding 
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telecommunications and broadcasting needs to be sufficiently well developed and open 
for digital networks, which require a great deal of bandwidth, to function efficaciously 
and at an affordable cost to the consumer. 
 
Almost more than anything the writer would recommend that legislators and/or 
regulators of technology should stop and think about the original policy and purpose 
informing the drafting of copyright legislation and bear in mind two well-known 
proverbs: 
 
 “Look before you leap”, and, “More haste, less speed”. 
 
After all, what must always be borne in mind is the impact that any legislation can 
have on both the economy and the development of technology. The economic, legal and 
technological developments within any marketplace operates as a kind of mini 
ecosystem, co-dependant on one another for progress and survival. Some solution to the 
problems posed by DRM and piracy is obviously necessary. What that solution will be is 
not yet certain or even foreseeable. What is certain though is that DRM is becoming a 
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